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ABSTRACT
Prior experiments revealed that investors’ overconfidence can result in 
excessive trade and negative wealth effects. However, in most of these 
studies, informational asymmetries were part of the experimental 
design, and therefore no clear conclusion on whether the obtained 
results were driven by overconfidence or informational asymmetries 
could be made. The article addresses this issue by analysing individual 
financial decisions based on the study of Michailova and Schmidt, who 
ran an asset markets experiment with no informational asymmetries. 
Additionally, the study controls for differences in individual risk 
aversion. The data revealed that, in this setting, individual trading 
activity and performance were influenced by overconfidence only for 
female participants. Mistakes in future price forecasting, which were 
negatively correlated with overconfidence, partially accounted for this 
result. Risk aversion was uncorrelated with overconfidence and had 
no influence on experimental outcomes. 
1. Introduction
By allowing psychological bias to affect their investment decisions, investors can do serious 
harm to their wealth (Baker & Nofsinger, 2002, p. 98). Overconfidence – a widely observed 
empirical phenomenon – is one of the biases that have potential importance for financial 
decision-making (Kahneman & Riepe, 1998). The overconfidence bias manifests itself in 
several effects: miscalibration, better-than-average effect and illusion of control. Moore and 
Healy (2008) suggest referring to these three facets of overconfidence as, correspondingly, 
overprecision, overplacement and overestimation. Miscalibration is defined as the over-
estimation of precision of one’s knowledge (see Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982). 
People’s inclination to have unrealistically positive views of the self with regard to skills or 
personal traits embodies itself as the better-than-average effect (see Taylor & Brown, 1988). 
Illusion of control is an unwarranted belief in having the ability to control one’s fate: e.g. 
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probability of personal success (see Langer, 1975). In this paper, we use miscalibration as 
the operationalisation of overconfidence.
Interest in the topic of economic consequences of investors’ overconfidence generated a 
large body of literature. Research findings suggest that investors’ overconfidence can result in 
trade aggressiveness (Deaves, Lüders, & Luo, 2009; Glaser, Nöth, & Weber, 2004), portfolio 
nondiversification (Odean, 1999), pursuit of the active portfolio management strategy (De 
Bondt & Thaler, 1984) and suboptimal performance (Barber & Odean, 2000, 2001; Fenton-
O’Creevy, Nicholson, Soane, & Willman, 2003). Moreover, overconfident investors tend 
to underestimate risks and, as a result, take more risks in comparison to rational traders 
(Croson & Gneezy, 2008; Glaser et al., 2004; Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1992; Russo 
& Schoemaker, 1992).
Previous experimental studies investigate the effect of overconfidence on investors’ trad-
ing activity and performance in the context of experimental asset markets with asymmetric 
information (see Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, & Pouget, 2005; Deaves et al., 2009; Kirchler & 
Maciejovsky, 2002). Biais et al. (2005) and Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) employed 
mixed market structure in which both more and less overconfident traders interacted. 
Their expectation was that less overconfident subjects would take advantage of the more 
overconfident ones. Deaves et al. (2009), on the contrary, employed pure market structure, 
in which all players in the market were either of low or high overconfidence. Additionally, 
as mentioned above, in all these experiments, participants were supplied with asymmet-
ric pieces of information. For example, in Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002), half of the 
participants had no information about the dividend distribution, and the other half had 
complete information. We believe that such an approach raises the question of whether 
differences which were discovered in individual performance in these experiments were a 
result of varying degrees of subjects’ overconfidence or were merely the effect of informa-
tional asymmetries. The main aim of our paper is to disentangle these two effects and study 
the impact of overconfidence on individual economic behaviour in pure experimental asset 
markets with no informational asymmetries. For that we analyse the data obtained in the 
experimental study by Michailova and Schmidt (2016). This study (1) employs the classic 
experimental market design of Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) and (2) assigns sub-
jects to markets based on their overconfidence (pure market setting), yet it also (3) removes 
informational asymmetries. To capture the possible channels through which overconfidence 
might influence experimental decisions, we also control for individual risk aversion and 
future price expectations.
In this paper, we test the following hypotheses:
Empirical and experimental findings obtained from a mixed market setting suggest that 
a higher degree of traders’ overconfidence reduces their welfare (Barber & Odean, 2001; 
Biais et al., 2005; Kirchler & Maciejovsky, 2002; Nöth & Weber, 2003). This might be due 
to the fact that overconfident traders engage in trade more actively and, as a consequence 
(of this active trade), incur losses (Barber & Odean, 2001; Glaser et al., 2004), i.e. they are 
outperformed by low turnover traders (Barber & Odean, 2000). Thus, our first aim is to 
test whether these relationships also hold in the pure market under a no informational 
asymmetries experimental setting.
By its very definition, overconfidence occurs when individual confidence systemati-
cally exceeds individual accuracy (Bar-Hillel, 2001; Moore & Healy, 2008), thus there is 
a negative relationship between overconfidence and accuracy. Therefore, we suggest that 
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more overconfident subjects are also less accurate (successful) in the price forecasting task. 
Moreover, these errors in prediction induce false future price expectations and cause mis-
takes in financial decisions, resulting in more active trading and, eventually, in losses. For 
example, in the experiment by Smith et al. (1988), better forecasters have indeed enjoyed 
higher gains from trade in the experimental market.
There is copious empirical and experimental evidence that higher risk propensity is 
accompanied by an increase in trade frequency, and on the contrary, higher risk aver-
sion manifests itself in lower market activity (Durand, Newby, & Sanghani, 2008; Fellner 
& Maciejovsky, 2007; Markiewicz & Weber, 2013; Robin, Straznicka, & Villeval, 2012). 
Overconfidence, however, is a factor that induces active engagement in trading (see above). 
This sparks our interest in which of the two effects has the dominant impact on the trading 
activity in the experimental market: risk aversion or overconfidence.
Finally, we analyse the dependence between the size of the final experimental portfolio 
and individual risk aversion. Since the dividend value of assets in our experiment changes 
in a probabilistic manner from period to period, each stock could be perceived as some 
sort of a lottery by players. Therefore, we expect participants who dislike risk to try to sell 
their assets at the early stages of the experiment; on the contrary, more risk-loving subjects 
would try to acquire more asset items.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a description of the experimental pro-
cedures used by Michailova and Schmidt (2016), Section 3 presents an analysis of results 
and Section 4 concludes.
2. Experimental design
2.1. Overconfidence measurement
Individual overconfidence of potential participants of experimental asset market was meas-
ured in three pre-experimental sessions using the procedure of Michailova and Katter 
(2014). First, subjects were asked to complete a general knowledge quiz consisting of 18 
questions and state how confident they were in the correctness of each answer. For this 
purpose any number from 33% (complete uncertainty) to 100% (complete certainty) could 
be used. Each question had three alternative answers, only one of which was right (see 
Appendix 1). In each pre-experimental session, subjects competed for three monetary prizes 
based on their accuracy in answering the quiz questions.
Then, overconfidence was calculated for each subject separately as the difference between 
the average confidence in correctness of their answers and the average actual accuracy. The 
obtained measure is called a bias score (BS) (Equation 1):
 
The positive BS indicates overconfidence, and the negative BS indicates underconfidence; 
a zero BS indicates perfect calibration. Only subjects who had the highest and lowest over-
confidence scores were invited to participate in the market experiment. Among them, two 
types of markets were constructed: low overconfidence and high overconfidence. Over the 
course of the experiment, subjects interacted only with subjects of their own type, i.e. either 
low overconfidence or high overconfidence subjects. It is important to mention that subjects 
were aware neither that the knowledge quiz was a precursor of another experiment nor that 
their results in the quiz were linked to their grouping in the experimental asset market.
(1)bias score = average% confidence− average% correct
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2.2. Asset market experiment
The main experiment was conducted using 60 students of social sciences from the Christian-
Albrechts University of Kiel. Thirty-five males and 25 females, aged 19 to 28, participated in 
10 computerised market sessions. The overconfidence (bias) scores of these subjects are pre-
sented in Table 1. The experiment was programmed with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007). On average, subjects earned 10.54 EUR for their participation in the experiment 
(excluding reward for forecasting).
The experimental procedure was based on the pioneering work of Smith et al. (1988). 
Prior to the start of the experiment, each subject was given 300 experimental currency units 
(ECU) and 3 experimental asset units. The experimental market consisted of the sequence 
of 15 trading periods, lasting a maximum 180 seconds, during which each trader could 
trade in experimental assets. At the end of the trading period, each asset in the participants’ 
inventory paid a dividend with possible values of 0.0, 0.8, 2.8 or 6.0 ECU; the probability of 
each value was p = 0.25. Thus, the average dividend which subjects could expect through 
many draws was 2.4 ECU. The fundamental value (FV) of one asset unit equalled n × 2.4 
ECU, where n was the number of periods remaining at the end of the session.1
Additionally, at the end of each trading period, subjects were asked to predict the average 
market price in the next period and state their confidence in their prediction. Any value 
between 0% (disbelief that the forecast was correct) and 100% (certainty that the forecast was 
correct) could be used to express subjects’ confidence. For the forecasting task, participants 
were awarded based on the accuracy of their forecast: if their forecast fell within 10% of the 
real price, it earned 3 ECU; forecasts within 25% and 50% of the real price therefore earned 
1 ECU and 0.5 ECU. Gains from the forecasting task were not added to subjects’ working 
capital, but were accumulated in a separate account. At the end of the experimental session, 
each participant was paid in cash the amount of money that was based on (1) their final 
working capital and (2) total gains from forecasting. Appendix 2 presents the summary 
statistics of demographic variables and variables describing participants’ behaviour in the 
experimental asset market.
2.3. Risk aversion measurement
Individual risk aversion was assessed a few months after the completion of the experimental 
asset market. Of the 32 repeatedly recruited subjects, 16 were former participants of the 
high overconfidence markets (OVE = 20.17, SD = 6.48) and 16 of the low overconfidence 
markets (OVE = 2.01, SD = 3.10). Holt and Laury’s (2002) lottery-choice task was employed 
for the risk aversion measurement. This task required subjects to make 10 choices between 
two paired lotteries: Option A and Option B. The possible payoff for Option A was either 
3 EUR or 2.40 EUR and for Option B 5.78 EUR or 0.15 EUR (see Table 2).
Table 1. overconfidence (bias) scores of experimental participants.
N Mean SD Min Max
all 60 11.20 12.08 −5.89 43.50
high overconfidence 30 21.33 8.26 10.17 43.50
Low overconfidence 30 1.06 4.02 −5.89 6.78
source: author’s calculations.
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A total number of choices A was used to assess individual risk aversion: a risk-neutral 
person would make four A choices and then switch to Option B; a risk-averse person would 
make more than four A choices and a risk-loving person would make fewer than four A 
choices (see Holt & Laury, 2002).
3. Experimental results
3.1. Univariate and bivariate analysis
We assume independence across subjects and start this section by analysing the trading 
activity of experimental participants. Generally individual average trading activity, defined 
as the mean of transactions (purchases and sales) conducted by an individual over the ses-
sion and divided by the number of shares outstanding in the market (18), was quite high: 
on average per session, traders had transacted 0.89 times the outstanding stock of shares 
(SD = 0.47). An increase in traders’ overconfidence was accompanied by an increase in their 
trading activity (Pearson correlation (58) = 0.350, p < 0.01, one-sided), which is consistent 
with the hypothesis that more overconfident investors engage in trade more actively. When 
we analysed the relationship between trading activity and individual overconfidence for 
females and males separately, we found no significant linear relationship between the two 
variables of interest for males (Pearson correlation (33) = 0.118, p = 0.249, one-sided). 
However, with an increase in overconfidence, female participants engaged in trading more 
actively (Pearson correlation (23) = 0.635, p = 0.00, one-sided). Nevertheless, there was no 
difference in the frequency of transactions between female and male participants (Mann-
Whitney Z = ‒0.105, p = 0.916, two-sided).
To test the proposition that high-turnover traders would be outperformed by low-turn-
over traders, normalised profits per participant were calculated as individual gains scaled 
by the initial portfolio value (36 ECU × 3 = 106 ECU). These profits and their correspond-
ing average trading activity are presented in Figure 1. Data in the graph are arranged in 
the increasing order of trading activity values and are plotted with the linear trend line, 
which demonstrates that increases in trading activity were accompanied by decreases in 
individual gains.
Average normalised profits of all participants equalled 3.61 times the value of the initial 
portfolio (SD = 1.83).2 The correlation coefficient between trading activity and individual 
earnings was small but significant, implying that increased trading is paired with poorer 
performance (Pearson correlation (58) = ‒0.292, p < 0.05, one-sided). Exclusion of the 
Table 2. holt and Laury (2002) lottery-choice decisions.
Option A Option B
1/10 of 3 EUR, 9/10 of 2.40 EUR 1/10 of 5.78 EUR, 9/10 of 0.15 EUR
2/10 of 3 EUR, 8/10 of 2.40 EUR 2/10 of 5.78 EUR, 8/10 of 0.15 EUR
3/10 of 3 EUR, 7/10 of 2.40 EUR 3/10 of 5.78 EUR, 7/10 of 0.15 EUR
4/10 of 3 EUR, 6/10 of 2.40 EUR 4/10 of 5.78 EUR, 6/10 of 0.15 EUR
5/10 of 3 EUR, 5/10 of 2.40 EUR 5/10 of 5.78 EUR, 5/10 of 0.15 EUR
6/10 of 3 EUR, 4/10 of 2.40 EUR 6/10 of 5.78 EUR, 4/10 of 0.15 EUR
7/10 of 3 EUR, 3/10 of 2.40 EUR 7/10 of 5.78 EUR, 3/10 of 0.15 EUR
8/10 of 3 EUR, 2/10 of 2.40 EUR 8/10 of 5.78 EUR, 2/10 of 0.15 EUR
9/10 of 3 EUR, 1/10 of 2.40 EUR 9/10 of 5.78 EUR, 1/10 of 0.15 EUR
10/10 of 3 EUR, 0/10 of 2.40 EUR 10/10 of 5.78 EUR, 0/10 of 0.15 EUR
source: author’s calculations.
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two possible outlier values substantially increased the strength of this linear relationship 
(Pearson correlation (56) = ‒0.456, p = 0.00, one-sided).
The sample was further broken into four equal sub-samples, ranked in terms of trading 
activity (quartiles) (see Figure 2). Individual earnings in the lowest and the highest trading 
activity quartiles were compared. The Mann-Whitney test detected that traders from the 
latter quartile were significantly outperformed by traders in the former, who earned on 
average 38% more ECUs at the end of the experiment (Z = ‒1.555, p < 0.10, one-sided); with-
out the two possible outliers, this difference increased to 56% (Mann-Whitney Z = ‒2.095, 
p < 0.05, one-sided). Therefore, our hypothesis was supported. This finding is in line with 
Barber and Odean (2000), who revealed that high-turnover households were outperformed 
by low-turnover households.
To determine the relationship between accuracy of average price prediction and indi-
vidual earnings, we first calculated precision of price predictions, which was expressed as 
the Average Absolute Error (Equation 2):
 
where, Fit is the forecast (prediction) of subject i for the period t, Pt is the average real price 
in period t, and T is the total number of periods in experimental session (T = 15).
As we hypothesised, a statistically significant linear relationship between overconfidence 
and errors in market price predictions was detected (Pearson correlation (58) = 0.350, 
p < 0.01, one-sided). Thus, increased overconfidence was indeed paired with reduction in 
accuracy of prediction. Furthermore, correlation between errors in future price predictions 
and individual profits was negative and significant (Pearson correlation (58) = ‒0.36, p < 0.01, 
one-sided). Interestingly, we find that female participants were significantly less accurate 
than males in their price predictions3 (Mann-Whitney Z = ‒1.957, p = 0.05, two-sided). 









Figure 1. normalised profits per participant. source: author’s calculations.
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Another factor that had a negative impact on individual earnings was the number of assets 
in participants’ final inventory (Pearson correlation (58) = ‒0.225, p < 0.05, one-sided).
3.2. Multivariate analysis
Trading activity
This subsection presents the results of cross-sectional regressions estimating the relation-
ship between the average trading activity of an individual and several explanatory variables 
that might affect the efficiency of financial decision-making (the standard error terms are 
shown in parentheses): the normalised bias score4 (NBS), gender dummy (this variable 
takes the value 1 if the subject is male), an interaction term between the bias score and 
gender (NBS*Gender); subjects’ experience expressed as age (Age) or duration of studies 
(Semester); and price-forecasting precision measured as average absolute error (AAE). We 
assume that observations across individuals are independent and start with the simplest 
model specification in which average trading activity is regressed on individual degree of 
overconfidence (NBS). Subsequently, a range of alternative specifications are estimated by 
adding other regressors to the model. For the specifications of the estimated models, see 
Table 3.5
The results, presented in Table 3, led to the following conclusions: (1) holding all other 
factors constant, the impact of overconfidence on trade was positive for female participants, 
i.e. with an increase in overconfidence, females engaged in more market transactions than 
males, and (2) forecasting errors that induced false future price expectations forced subjects 
to engage in trading more actively. Modest success in explaining variation in trading activ-
ity in the sample by means of selected models suggests that other unobserved factors that 
were not included in the regression also have an impact on the average number of market 
transactions by an individual participant. We return to this issue in the section on risk 
Figure 2. Distribution of individual profits across trading activity quartiles. source: author’s calculations.
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aversion analysis, where the regression model is re-estimated for a sample of participants 
whose risk aversion measures were obtained.
Gains from trade
This subsection presents the results of cross-sectional regressions estimating the relationship 
between subjects’ performance in the experiment and several explanatory variables (the 
standard error terms are shown in parentheses): the normalised bias score (NBS), gender 
dummy (takes value 1 if the subject is male), average trading activity (Trading activity), an 
interaction term between gender and trading activity (Gender*Trading activity), subject’s 
age (Age), the number of assets in the final inventory (End assets), and price forecasting 
precision measured as average absolute forecasting error (AAE). Individual performance 
was assessed as relative profit, calculated based on Hirota and Sunder (2007) as gains from 
trade divided by the FV of the initial portfolio of three stocks (36 ECU × 3 = 106 ECU) minus 
the cross-sectional average of this ratio. We assume that observations across individuals are 
independent and start again with the simplest model specification, in which relative profit 
is regressed on the individual degree of overconfidence (NBS) and gender; subsequently, 
a range of alternative specifications are estimated by adding other regressors to the model. 
For the specifications of the estimated models, see Table 4.
The results presented in Table 4 suggest that (1) contrary to the formulated hypothesis, 
overconfidence had no significant (direct) effect on individual earnings; (2) holding all 
other factors constant, the impact of trading activity on relative profit was more negative 
for female than male participants, i.e. with an increase in the number of market trans-
actions, males incurred smaller losses or even yielded gains in comparison to females; 
(3) forecasting errors that induced false future price expectations and caused mistakes in 
financial decision-making (Biais et al., 2005) produced losses; and (4) the number of assets 
in the final inventory was a significant determinant of reduction in gains. In general, the 
Table 3. trading activity (errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and for correlation within session 
clusters).
****0.001;  ***0.01; **0.05; *0.1. 
aone-sided test.
source: author’s calculations.
  1 2 3 4 5 6 6a 7
c 0.659**** 0.692**** 0.498**** 1.338* 0.734**** 1.218* 1.299* 1.815**
(0.083) (0.089) (0.086) (0.711) (0.141) (0.711) (0.726) (0.869)
nBs 0.671**** 0.682**** 1.285**** 1.236**** 1.147**** 0.993**** 1.050**** 0.859*
(0.132) (0.131) (0.224) (0.237) (0.205) (0.272) (0.245) (0.774)
Gender   −0.062 0.301*** 0.253** 0.252* 0.317*** 0.267*** 0.470
  (0.097) (0.109) (0.109) (0.128) (0.107) (0.093) (0.269)
nBs*Gender     −1.069*** −0.991*** −0.993*** −0.934** −0.951*** −1.307*, a
    (0.340) (0.342) (0.323) (0.357) (0.337) (0.878)
age       −0.036   −0.040 −0.041 −0.060*
      (0.029)   (0.028) (0.028) (0.033)
semester         −0.046**      
        (0.020)      
aaE           0.036** 0.027*** 0.040**
          (0.014) (0.008) (0.017)
safe choices               −0.023
              (0.026)
N 60 60 60 60 54 60 59 32
adj. R2 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.25 0.15
sERegr 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.38 0.40
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described specifications succeeded quite well in explaining the variation in relative profits 
in the sample. Yet the amount of unexplained variation suggests that other unobserved 
factors that were not included in the regression were also present.
3.3. Risk aversion measurement: experimental results
On average, the subjects were found to be risk averse (M = 5.66; SD = 1.82), and choices of 
even 71.88% of the participants fell at the interval of [5, 7] safe options. Men took on average 
5.68 safe choices (SD = 2.00) and women 5.62 safe choices (SD = 1.61). The difference in 
the average number of safe choices taken by both genders is insignificant (Mann-Whitney 
Z = ‒0.452, p = 0.652, two-sided); this is in line with previous research findings (e.g. Holt 
& Laury, 2002; Michailova, Tyszka, & Pfeifer, 2016). The correlation coefficient between 
risk aversion and individual overconfidence implies no linear relationship between them 
(Spearman’s Rho (30) = ‒0.095, p = 0.303, one-sided). The presented evidence suggests that 
risk aversion, measured in a lottery-type task, had no explanatory power over subjects’ 
overconfidence.
We predicted that risk aversion had a negative effect on individual trading activity and 
the size of the final portfolio. However, no linear relationship between these variables 
was detected (trade: Spearman’s Rho (30) = ‒0.100, p = 0.294, one-sided; portfolio size: 
Spearman’s Rho (30) = ‒0.001, p = 0.498, one-sided). An additional inspection of Equation 
7 (see Table 3) revealed no significant effect of risk aversion on the frequency of trading. 
Although we had no specific hypothesis formulated, we have also checked whether there 
was a linear relationship between individual gains and risk aversion. This relationship was 
also found to be insignificant (Spearman’s Rho (30) = 0.031, p = 0.433, one-sided). It can be 
concluded that, in this sample, differences between the traders in experimental outcomes 
were driven by overconfidence and not risk aversion.
Table 4. Gains from trade (errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and for correlation within session 
clusters).
****0.001; ***0.01; **0.05; *0.1. 
source: author’s calculations.
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
c 2.838 3.717 4.770**** 2.994 4.052 3.771 5.128****
(0.297) (0.338) (0.265) (4.101) (3.366) (3.409) (0.303)
nBs 0.065 0.931 1.574* 1.499 1.179 1.467 1.483
(0.722) (0.979) (0.892) (1.022) (1.026) (1.059) (1.038)
Gender 1.293** 1.213** −1.013* −0.837 −0.447 −0.471 −0.589
(0.564) (0.513) (0.598) (0.603) (0.468) (0.456) (0.519)
trading activity   −1.271*** −2.654**** −2.503**** −2.333**** −2.081**** −2.216****
  (0.420) (0.399) (0.641) (0.601) (0.607) (0.389)
trading activity * Gender     2.454** 2.313** 2.458** 2.265** 2.393**
    (1.006) (0.986) (1.019) (1.025) (1.058)
age     0.072 0.033 0.056
    (0.164) (0.131) (0.135)
End assets       −0.169* −0.152* −0.158*
      (0.087) (0.090) (0.086)
aaE       −0.071* −0.064*
      (0.037) (0.036)
N 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
adjR2 0.09 0.17 0.26 0.25 0.36 0.36 0.37
sERegr 1.75 1.67 1.58 1.59 1.46 1.46 1.45
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4. Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to investigate the influence of the degree of overconfidence 
and risk aversion on the financial decision-making of economic subjects. To address this 
research question, we use data from the asset market experiment and post hoc risk aversion 
measurement by Michailova and Schmidt (2016).
Our results suggest that, although generally the genders did not differ in their trading 
frequency, for female participants, an increase in overconfidence was paired with an increase 
in trading activity, which resulted in losses. This relationship did not hold for male partic-
ipants, for whom more active trading in some instances even yielded gains. Surprisingly, 
overconfidence had no direct wealth effects for female or male participants. However, we 
found support for the proposition that overconfidence had significant negative influence 
on forecasting accuracy that in turn forced subjects to engage in trading more actively. 
Moreover, in line with previous research (see Smith et al., 1988), forecasting errors were 
associated with losses. Females in our experiment generated significantly less accurate pre-
dictions of future market prices than males, which was in line with the findings by Eckel 
and Füllbrunn (2015). Unlike them, our measure of forecasting accuracy did not allow us to 
make any conclusions about the direction (underestimation or overestimation) of mistakes 
in the price forecasts. Nevertheless, we conclude that, in the setting with no informational 
asymmetries and pure markets, trading activity and performance were driven by over-
confidence only for female participants, and this suggests lower forecasting accuracy by 
female subjects as a possible explanation for this finding. Finally, we found no evidence of 
the existence of the relationship between the individual risk aversion (estimated using the 
Holt and Laury task) and overconfidence, trading activity or final portfolio size. Therefore, 
we conclude that, in the reduced sample, differences in the experimental outcomes were 
driven by overconfidence and not risk aversion.
Our research suggests that there is indeed a difference between economic behaviour and 
the financial results of more and less overconfident traders in experimental asset markets, 
and this difference might be gendered. As one of the possible explanations for these find-
ings, mistakes in predicting future market prices were suggested. However, our study does 
not allow us to directly determine and analyse channels through which overconfidence 
influences the economic behaviour of experimental participants, which we believe should 
be the next step in future research.
Evidence presented in this paper could be of benefit to policy-makers: our results indicate 
that psychological bias of overconfidence could be harming investors’ wealth, which in turn 
can have negative macroeconomic consequences and harm sustainable economic develop-
ment (Dubauskas, 2016; Kulišauskas & Galinienė, 2015; Laužikas & Krasauskas, 2013; Peker, 
Tvaronavičienė, & Aktan, 2014; Stasytytė, 2015; Tvaronavičienė, 2014). Therefore, we suggest 
that governments should invest in increasing individual financial literacy, which will help 
to mitigate the impact of overconfidence on investment decisions and to achieve sustain-
able management of individual finances (Ciemleja, Lace, & Titko, 2014; Dubauskas, 2016; 
Kalyugina, Strielkowski, Ushvitsky, & Astachova, 2015; Njaramba, Chigeza, & Whitehouse, 
2015). Moreover, it could also direct individuals towards more socially responsible investing 
(Slapikaitė, Tamošiūnienė, & Mackevičiūtė, 2015).
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Notes
1.  The FV of one asset unit at the beginning of experimental session is therefore 36 ECU 
(= 15 × 2.4 ECU).
2.  Two values, namely 7.92 and 8.39, are possible outliers.
3.  AAEfemale = 8.48 (SD = 4.51); AAEmale = 6.36 (SD = 2.88).
4.  A sample of bias scores of the participants is normalised on an interval [0,1].
5.  Equation 7 is discussed in subsection ‘Risk aversion measurement: experimental results’.
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Appendix 1.
Michailova and Katter (2014) overconfidence measurement questions (correct answer is underlined).
What is the name for an instant camera? canon camera Polaroid camera minolta camera
What is a rollmop made of? herring pork salmon
What is a hot chili sauce? tabasco curacao macao
What is the name of Eskimo snow shelter? wigwam igloo tipi
What enterprise belongs to Bill Gates? intel microsoft Dell computers
What is the islamic month of fasting called? sharia Ramadan imam
Where do flounders usually live? among the reeds amongst coral reefs on the sea bed 
What country does the nobel Prize winner in Literature Gabriel 
García márquez come from?
spain venezuela colombia
What artistic movement does anacreontics belong to? Rococo Romanticism Realism
how many letters are there in the Russian alphabet? 40 33 26
What is the name of the Greek Goddess of Wisdom? Pallas athena nike Penelope
What is ascorbic acid? apple vinegar vitamin a vitamin c 
‘tosca’ is an opera by...? G. Puccini G. verdi a. vivaldi
What is the most abundant metal on Earth? iron aluminium copper
What is a word to describe an uninformed person? ignatius ignorant ideologue
Who was the first person to fly around the Eiffel tower in an 
airship?
santos-Dumont count Zeppelin saint-Exupéry
What language does the term ‘Fata morgana’ come from? arabic swahili italian 




N Mean SD Min. Max.
Profit 60 390.36 197.89 4.20 906.20
Relative profit 60 0.00 1.83 −3.58 4.78
Profit/initial portfolio value 60 3.61 1.83 0.04 8.39
age 60 22.77 2.13 19.00 28.00
semester 54 3.39 2.10 1.00 12.00
End assets 60 3.00 4.04 0.00 18.00
aaE 60 7.24 3.76 1.79 20.64
trading activity (average) 60 0.89 0.47 0.14 2.25
source: author’s calculations.
